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The question whether obesity leads to an increased risk of mortality 
among individuals with chronic disease is of interest to many clinicians 
and epidemiologists1. Understanding the answer to that question may 
help to assess the importance and potential impact of interventions that 
target weight loss in this disease group. Because such interventions 
must take place after disease onset, epidemiological studies that aim to 
address this question should assess the association between changes in 
body mass since disease onset and mortality in such individuals. 
Collider bias - and the related obesity paradox - is only one of several 
adverse consequences of not adhering to this important principle. 
Asking the wrong question 
Whether collider bias can distort the association between obesity and 
mortality in, say, diabetic patients to a degree that matters, necessarily 
depends on the interpretation one assigns to that association. Viallon 
and Dufournet2 and Sperrin et al.3, along with a number of other 
authors (see e.g. 4) consider interpretation in terms of a controlled 
direct effect of obesity on mortality in diabetic patients. However, this 
does not capture how one is likely to interpret that association and, 
moreover, does not reflect the effect of clinical interest. The reason is 
that a controlled direct effect expresses the effect obesity would have 
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on mortality if one were to induce diabetes, an intervention that 
clinicians obviously do not envisage.  
Of the effect measures considered in Sperrin et al.5 and Viallon and 
Dufournet2, the one which arguably comes closest to clinicians’ 
interest, is that originally considered by Sperrin et al.5. In particular, let 
A denote 1 for obese individuals (and 0 otherwise) and M denote 1 for 
diabetic individuals (and 0 otherwise). In typical studies reporting on 
the obesity paradox, including 2,5 , the measurement A reflects a cause 
(rather than an effect) of chronic disease M. This is generally quite 
plausible when, as is the case in many studies, A and M are measured 
concurrently or when A is measured prior to the diagnosis of diabetes. 
Focussing on this setting, Sperrin et al.5 consider a contrast between 
E(Y1|M=1) and E(Y0|M=1), with Y1 (Y0) the counterfactual mortality 
status if (not) obese. Further letting M1 (M0) be the counterfactual 
diabetes status if (not) obese, and p=P(A=1|M=1), we have that  
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where we use that Y1 equals 
11MY , the counterfactual mortality status if 
obese with diabetes status M1. Likewise,  
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It follows from the above that the causal effect of obesity in diabetic 
patients,  1 0CE 1 1M E Y Y M    , equals the controlled direct effect 
of obesity in diabetic patients,  11 01CDE 1 1M E Y Y M    , when for 
all individuals, obesity does not affect the risk of diabetes (i.e. M1=M0), 
but not generally otherwise; this is precisely the setting where collider 
bias is not a concern. I conclude that the results of Viallon and 
Dufournet2 and Sperrin et al.3 do not provide immediate insight into 
the extent to which collider bias can make the association between 
obesity and mortality in diabetic patients differ from the effect of 
obesity on mortality in those patients. 
Giving the wrong answer 
The simulation results in 5 (as well as those in 2 for 
CDE 1M
 ) moreover 
ignore important subtleties by relying on strong cross-world 
assumptions: assumptions about the dependence between 
counterfactuals existing in ‘different worlds’ (‘with’ versus ‘without’ 
obesity). In particular, the displays in the previous section shows that 
the calculation of 
CE 1M 
  requires assumptions about the dependence 
between 
1aMY  and M0, and thus in particular about the dependence 
between M1 and M0; 5 implicitly assume that M1 and M0 are perfectly 
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correlated. Such knowledge about the joint distribution of the 
counterfactuals M1 and M0 is unavailable in practice and not obtainable 
from - even experimental - data6. In view of this, Viallon and 
Dufournet2 and Sperrin et al.3 redirect attention to the controlled direct 
effect 
CDE 1M
 . However, to calculate it, they assume that Y0m is 
independent of M1, given A=1 and U (with U representing a variable 
that - along with A - is sufficient to adjust for confounding of the effect 
of M on Y). Also this cross-world assumption is often biologically 
implausible7. Although similar assumptions are routinely employed in 
mediation analysis, they are arguably more innocent in that context, 
where the key direct and indirect effect measures remain interpretable 
even when those assumptions fail8-10; such rescue interpretation is less 
obvious for 
CDE 1M
 .  
Realistic projections of the extent of collider bias should consider the 
above subtleties and, moreover, recognise that the extent of collider 
bias is model dependent (e.g., it does not arise in certain classes of 
multiplicative models11 and logistic models12. To the best of my 
knowledge, most studies that quantify the role of collider bias in the 
obesity paradox, have focussed on a single dichotomous confounder U 
(which is not affected by obesity) (see e.g. 4,13,14 ). This is a 
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serious oversimplification of reality, which is likely to minimise the 
role of collider bias. In the next section, I aim to provide more general 
insight. 
A broader perspective on collider bias 
In essence, the problem of collider bias is not less important than that 
of confounding bias. Consider for instance the causal diagram of Figure 
1 (left). When all variables are dichotomous, taking values 0 and 1, 
then it readily follows from Bayes’ rule that the conditional U-A odds 
ratio, given M=1, can be rewritten as  
   
   
1 1, 1 1 0, 0
;
1 0, 1 1 1, 0
P M A U P M A U
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     
 (1) 
the extent to which it differs from 1 expresses the degree of collider 
bias. When the data are instead generated as in Figure 1 (right), then it 
further follows from Bayes’ rule that for a,u=0,1,  
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At such data-generating mechanisms, Equation 1 reduces to  
   
   
1 1 0 1
.
1 1 0 0
P U A P U A
P U A P U A
   
   
 
 
Interestingly, this is the reciprocal of the marginal U-A odds ratio, 
which expresses the degree of confounding bias in Figure 1 (right). It 
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follows that confounding and collider-stratification both bias the A-U 
association to the same extent in this case. 
Similar findings are obtained when all variables are multivariate 
normal. Then it can be shown along similar lines as in15 that under the 
causal diagram of Figure 1 (left), the standardised path coefficient on A 
in a linear regression of U on A and M is given by  
2
,
1
mu ma
ma
 



 
where 
mu  is the correlation between M and U and ma  is the correlation 
between M and A. This dependence of U on A is again the result of 
collider bias. Its magnitude is determined by the extent to which M is 
associated with both A and U, and can be especially sizeable when A 
strongly affects M. Incidentally, the term 
mu ma   in the numerator is 
also equal to the standardised path coefficient on A in a linear 
regression of U on A under the causal diagram of Figure 1 (right), 
which reflects the extent of confounding bias in that diagram.  
 Figure 1: Left: Causal diagram expressing collider bias; Right: Causal 
diagram expressing confounding bias. 
We conclude from the above that the problem of collider bias is, in 
essence, not less important than that of confounding bias. This is in line 
with Greenland16, who concludes that ‘bias from stratifying on 
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variables affected by exposure and disease may often be comparable in 
size with bias from classical confounding’; it moreover confirms the 
extreme selection biases found in 17. However, when considering 
collider bias of the association between A and Y (instead of U), then the 
extent of bias is obviously weakened due to the imperfect dependence 
between U and Y, just like the degree of confounding bias of the 
association between A and Y in Figure 1 (right) diminishes. Depending 
on the setting, collider bias (and likewise confounding bias) thus need 
not propagate to deliver sizeable bias in the exposure-outcome 
association16.  
Getting the wrong answer to the wrong question 
Regardless of whether or not collider bias forms the principal 
explanation for the obesity paradox, perhaps the biggest problems in all 
studies reporting on the obesity paradox are the following two. First, 
they attempt to evaluate the effect of an ill-defined intervention on 
obesity18. Second, even if a well-defined intervention were considered, 
they attempt to evaluate the effect of an intervention on obesity prior to 
disease onset in chronically ill patients. While interventions on obesity 
might be particularly useful for that subgroup, a good understanding of 
their effect would be of limited use for making public health decisions 
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as it would be unknown, at the time of decision making, who belongs 
to that group. An assessment of their effect would moreover be of 
limited use to gauge the potential impact of interventions on obesity 
that take place after disease onset. The nature of body mass prior to 
disease onset (which may be related to genetics, socioeconomic status, 
familial eating patterns, ...) and post disease onset (which may 
additionally be disease related, or related to the prescription of specific 
diets or physical exercise following disease onset) may be very 
different, making it unrealistic to believe that interventions on body 
mass have the same effect pre versus post disease onset.  
To evaluate the possible impact of obesity-related interventions on 
mortality in individuals with chronic disease based on observational 
studies, one must assess how changes in body mass after disease onset 
(ideally brought about by well-defined interventions) relate to 
mortality. When the data are deficient (in the sense that they provide no 
information on the change in body mass after disease onset), one is 
likely to find the wrong answer to the wrong question. The wrong 
answer, because deficient data demand dominant assumptions (cfr. the 
aforementioned need for cross-world assumptions). The wrong 
question, because the effect of obesity prior to disease onset is not 
directly informative about the effect which interventions on body mass 
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after disease onset might have.  
Epidemiologic studies that aim to guide decision-making should focus 
on the comparison of exposure groups that correspond to the 
intervention one wishes to evaluate. Only by adhering to this principle, 
one can avoid the above problem of collider bias and related issues of 
left truncation19. Such bias need not be less severe than bias as a result 
of ignoring confounders. I am grateful to Viallon and Dufournet for 
identifying subtleties in the calculation of 
CE 1M 
 , and clarifying that 
sensible degrees of bias may be plausible and may form an explanation 
for the obesity paradox, to Sperrin and collaborators for recognising  
these subtleties, and to the Editor for the opportunity to contribute to 
this discussion. 
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